Krokos Jan
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48(2012)2 - Papers

Jan Krokos

“Philosopie als Strenge Wissenschaft” and the Husserlian project of philosophical revival

  • language: Polish


Summary

The article "Philosopie als strenge Wissenschaft" ("Philosophy as a Rigorous Science") by Edmund Husserl published in 1911 at the request of the editors of "Logos" is a specific manifesto of phenomenology. The article combines Husserl’s early philosophy, the so–called eidetic phenomenology, with transcendental phenomenology. Also, it presents an outline of the project of philosophical, scientific and cultural revival. This project is a return to the classical ideal of philosophy as theoretical cognition that constitutes the ultimate reason. Philosophy so understood gives priority to the thing itself, and its aim is truth as an absolute value. The project of philosophical revival as outlined by Husserl was born in a particular intellectual situation of the 19th century. This situation was marked by two great philosophical traditions: Kantism and positivism. The former was the formalism a priori, the latter – the empiricism (however it restricted the object of possible experience to the material world). Both of them eventually departed from the thing itself, either considering it unknowable or accepting its depiction proposed by natural sciences. It resulted in agnosticism, scepticism, scientism and psychologism. The remedy for such a state of things lay in building a new philosophy of the absolute beginning. This philosophy was supposed to be a rigorous science in the form of phenomenology as the science of pure consciousness.

 

 
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48(2012)3 - Papers

Jan Krokos

Objectivity and validity of conscience

  • language: Polish


Summary

The issue of objectivity and validity of conscience is of great importance in understanding the functioning of conscience and man’s moral actions. Conscience is the axiological consciousness of the human act, which is co-constituted by intellect and will. Conscience accompanies the human act, witnesses it and, after reflection, assesses the act as either good or bad. Conscience is always subjective, because it is “my” conscience and “mine” is the judgement of conscience. However, when one thoroughly asserts their own actions, the kind of act it is, and whether it had good or bad intentions, then one’s conscience is objective. The objectivity of cognition of an act, in conscience and through conscience, relates to its validity. The objectivity of conscience is a condition sine qua non of its validity, which is traditionally understood as adaequatio intellectus et rei. In this case: as correspondence between a judgement of conscience and an act as the object of conscience. The objectivity and validity of judgement of conscience follows from its peculiarity and the peculiarity of its object, i.e. an act. Conscience is the axiological consciousness of one’s own (or someone else's) act, which operates in the interior horizon of moral knowledge comprising norms of acting, of which the most significant is the principle: good needs to be cultivated, whereas evil needs to be avoided. Conscience is a subtle cognitive tool given to man in order for man to live humanely – a tool that is under man's control.

 

 
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47(2011)2 - Dissertations

Jan Krokos

Is phenomenology metaphysics?

  • language: English


Summary

The question whether phenomenology is metaphysics is an extremely difficult one. The most common expression used to refer to metaphysics is ‘the fundamental philosophical science concerned with being as being’. Metaphysics is the first philosophy in the order of things, and being.

Aristotelian "first philosophy" was supposed to precede "second philosophy", i.e. physics. Husserl's phenomenology, being a science about the essence of pure consciousness, was supposed to precede eidetic formal sciences, eidetic material sciences and all sciences concerning facts, including metaphysics. Thus, in his declarations, Husserl distinguished phenomenology, including transcendental phenomenology, from metaphysics.

Husserl claimed that the question about the reason for being, its ratio, should not be the starting point in philosophy. In his opinion, the question that ought to introduce one to philosophy is the question of how every sense is constituted in consciousness, in subjectivity, or in the subject. Thus, Husserl's phenomenology, including transcendental phenomenology, is not metaphysics understood as the study of being qua being. It is not a contemplation of being, but a meditation on processes involved in consciousness, in which the sense of being is constituted.

 
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47(2011)4 - Science versus Utopia. Limits of Scientific Cognition

Jan Krokos

Rationality of science. Rationality of Utopia

  • language: Polish


Summary

Science and utopia are products of a human mind and in ontic sense they are rational beings. The rationality of utopia comes down to it’s coherence. The rationality of a science is identical with the rationality of cognition, i.e. with the objective justification.

 

 


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